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LAW AND THE CHANGING ORDER*
By

MARVIN

B.

ROSENBERRYI

M ANY persons are profoundly disturbed by the development which
our law has undergone during the period since the Civil War. It
is practically impossible for any citizen, unless he be a lawyer, to find the
law, and even a lawyer is quite likely to go astray in any field except
the one in which he specializes. Not only have legislative enactments
been multiplied beyond all precedent, but numerous regulatory bodies
have been created with vast powers-partly administrative, partly executive, and at least quasi-judicial. The law has many sources. The lines
which separate one field of law and governmental activities from another
are dim and wavering. Individual liberty, including the right of free
contract, has been greatly limited and circumscribed. Many changes
have taken place in the legal order, the significance of which is little
understood by those who have not made a special study of the subject.
On the one hand there are those who would preserve our law as it
existed fifty years ago without change; and on the other hand, there are
those who would greatly impair, if not completely destroy, our constitutional system.
Let us consider some of the reasons for these changes. As a basis of
discussion and for the purpose of illustration, let us contrast very briefly
a cross-section of American life as it was developed a hundred years
ago in the Middle West, with a cross-section of the life of the same
section"of to-day. It is only within the last decade that we have passed
from a nation predominantly rural to one predominantly urban. If we
examine an average home of a hundred years ago, we shall find that all
of the simpler processes of manufacture were carried on within that
home. Baking, canning, preserving, weaving, spinning, dressmaking,
making of ordinary clothing, and many other simple manufacturing
processes were done within its four walls. Upon the farm were produced all the principal articles of food and it supplied most of the raw
materials used in manufacturing. The slaughtering of animals, the
preservation of meats, the making of tools of the simpler sort, were
understood and practiced upon every farm. The family was an economic as well as a social unit. Every member of the family had a distinct responsibility for its success, for upon that depended the supply
* Reprinted from the September, 1924 issue by permission from The North
Anterican Review.
'Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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of food, clothing and comforts of life for each member. This made
for family solidarity, for a unity of family interest, for the upbuilding
and maintenance of strong family ties. The home was the center of instruction. The family altar was a reality, not a myth. People lived
out of doors more than in the house, and dealt constantly with the
irresistible forces of nature. Each family was surrounded by other
units whose interests were of the same sort. Between these units there
existed a community of interest which rested upon a common experience,
common desires and common ambitions. The family was butlittle dependent upon the adjacent village, though there were to be found the
grist mill, the blacksmith shop, the wagon shop, the shoemakers shop,
the tannery and the woolen mill. These institutions, together with the
local store through which came the silks, spices and other luxuries and
semi-luxuries from the outside world, supplied all the needs of the
community, and upon that simple basis society had been organized for
hundreds of years. Dynasties might rise and fall, governments might
come and go, but life flowed on in a steady, almost unvarying 9tream.
Traditions, both family and national, were strong. The sense of personal rights and political responsibility were keen, sharpened as they
were by the action and reaction of the frontier. There were great
families who occupied in some respects at least the position of feudal
lords, but they were few and far between and their aims, sympathies,
purposes and ambitions conformed very largely to those of the entire
group. It was for a society such as this that our Federal Constitution
and earlier State Constitutions were framed.
Let us observe what has happened to this social structure in the last
hundred years with the introduction of improvements in transportation
and the coming of the so-called industrial age. One after another the
simple manufacturing processes have been taken out of the home and
out of the small community, and concentrated in large units, mainly in
great centers of population. Even the farmer of to-day depends for his
flour upon the great milling centers of the country. Shoes are made not
by the village shoemaker, but in specialized manufacturing plants where
forty or fifty or even a hundred people may work upon a single pair of
shoes. Canning, preserving and baking have been taken from the
home and are in the hands of large operators with hundreds and often
thousands of employees. Not only have spinning and weaving long since
left the home for the factory, but nearly every thing we use is made
ready to wear or serve, involving a still greater kxtension of the factory
system. The village blacksmith shop and wagon shop have become
the automobile industry, upon which the country spends- annually a sum
equal to the national debt at the close of the Civil War. The local store

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

still struggles for existence in competition with chain stores and the catalogue houses. The ancient stage coach has given way to the modern
railway train. Great organizations of employees have sprung up able to
enforce their demands. The pressure for standardization and mass
production is so great that Arthur Pound finds it difficult to say who is
master-man or machine.
This change in our national life has come upon us with overpowering
swiftness. Some indication of the rate of change is indicated by the
fact that more iron and steel have been produced and used since 19oo
than in all the previous history of the world. In the Middle West it has
come with perhaps the greatest speed. We have passed within the spap
of a single life from a frontier agricultural community to a complex
industrial society. The dominant note of the life of our day is struck
not upon the farm, but in the city.
Let us examine a little more minutely what has happened to the
family unit with the taking of all of these processes out of the home and
rural community and into the factories. First of all, we must note that
with the processes there have gone the members of the family who
formerly did the work in the home, to do that work ha the factory to
which it has been transferred. As a consequence, the home no longer
functions as it did a hundred years ago. One member of the family
goes to work in one field of effort and another in a different field. There
is, therefore, much less family solidarity. Diversity of occupation makes
for diversity of interest. Family ties and restraints are much weakened.
The shift from the home to the factory has resulted in the creation of
a new set of human problems. These relate to education, social welfare
in all its manifold aspects, the creation of character building agencies
to supplement the home, the promotion of public health, and like matters.
With the increase of population and the increasing use of machinery,
there has developed a change in the nature of our problems. Consider
a single illustration. Under the conditions of a hundred years ago, the
earnings of the family were received and distributed by the head of the
family. While the earnings were the product of their joint effort, the
family was so far a unit that its earnings belonged legally to and were
in fact actually received and distributed by its head. If others not
members were employed, all obligation to them was discharged when
they left and their wage was paid. Those who were permanently members of the family expected ultimately to share the accumulations of the
group through inheritance or by devise. The home is no longer, except
in a very limited sense, a producing unit. It has become instead a disbursing unit. The processes of production are carried on elsewhere.
The earnings of the individual members of the family are brought to
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the home and they are there disbursed. Consequently the division of
the proceeds of productive effort no longer rests with the head of the
family, but with the management of the corporations which carry on the
productive enterprises in which the members of the family are engaged.
The struggle for a just distribution of these funds has created the wage
question, which in its larger aspects is often denominated the struggle
between labor and capital. This change or shift has created an entirely
new set of relationships as to which there was no standard or tradition,
and the consequent necessity for regulatory legislation of many kinds
and sorts. The new relationships are in many particulars analogous to
the old, but they are not the same. Under the old system, Nihen a member of the family was injured, the duty of caring for him devolved upon
the family and it was done at the expense of the family. At first the
factory system made no provision for accidents to one of its family,
so to speak. Consequently, within recent years, workmen's compensation laws have been enacted in most of the states to meet the situation.
In the same way laws relating to payment of wages, establishing minimum wages, fixing hours of labor, prescribing working conditions, have
been enacted in an effort to adapt ourselves to a life organized upon
an industrial basis.
In view of the fact that we have to a considerable degree lost one
social and racial tradition and have not as yet had an experience sufficiently long to gain another, it is not strange that there is in the public
mind much confusion, that there is much misdirected effort, and in
many instances, a total failure to visualize the situation as it in fact
exists. Races and peoples have a strong tendency to carry forward the
otandards and traditions of the past. An example is the shaking of
hands to bind a bargain, which has probably never had, certainly not
for some hundreds of years, any legal significance, and yet every one
of us would feel that a bargain upon which the parties had struck hands
had a stronger sanction than it would otherwise have. So our people
as a whole have a strong tendency to think in terms of the past rather
than the present. While many of the leaders of political and social
thought have quite clearly recognized the fundamental character of the
trend of our time, it is only dimly apprehended by the great mass of
our people. It may be said without disparagement that some of those
whose apprehensions are quite dim, occasionally find their way into
legislative bodies and into _public offices. There they endeavor to force
a complex industrial society into the legal and social traditions applicable
to a rural agricultural society. To be wholly frank, it must also be said
that many industrial managers have not yet realized the change in relationship and still regard their business as having no other than a private significance.
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In an effort to readjust society to these fundamental changes, there
has been the-greatest outpouring of statutory law the world has ever
seen. Statute is piled upon statute, administrative agency upon administrative agency, and to the great body of statutory law has been
added a mass of administrative orders, with the force of law, until in
the general confusion we have almost lost our place. The enactment of
these various laws and the making of these various orders have given
the world the most remarkable exhibition of the trial and error method
ever seen. As a people, we are quick, inclined to be impatient, and
somewhat superficial. We are not willing to wait for results and are
restive under restraints, even though they have been set up by ourselves
for our own protection. The crucial period in this process of readjustment will come no doubt within the next fifty years. No one can now
regard the adjustment as nearing completion, nor can we be certain that
the fundamental principles upon which it is to be finally worked out are
as yet clearly marked out.
It cannot be truthfully said that all lawyers or even all judges have
perceived the fundamental nature of our problems and guided themselves accordingly. The social trend of our time is fundamental rather
than superficial. We are, so to speak, turning a corner in social development. We are in the process of passing from one great tradition into
another. We are endeavoring to adjust the political and social concepts
of an age predominantly rural and agricultural to one which is predominantly industrial and commercial. Human relationships have been
vitally altered in many ways. If industrial society is to continue on
its present basis, those who have gone out of the home into the factory
must there have the safeguards, the guidance and the fair share of the
proceeds of industry which they formerly enjoyed as members of a
small economic unit, because no form of society can long exist which
does not do substantial justice to its members.
We cannot crowd the present industrial order into the legal molds
which gave the rural agricultural order its permanence and stability.
They are two different things. The process of adjustment, however,
must follow some legal principle. Before the process is completed, we
must make a final choice as to the fundamental underlying principles
upon which the new order is to be based, and we are to-day as a people
engaged in doing that very thing. The choice will not be made at one
time. It will be partly a matter of judgment, partly a matter of development and growth. The ultimate choice lies between our constitutional
system which upholds the right of private property even under an industrial order, and a more or less speculative untried system, which in
one form or another lodges complete control over our liberties and our
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property in the state. It makes no difference by what name you call this
second concept-names are immaterial. Nor does it matter how respectable a disguise it wears. Under our Constitution and the old order,
we had attained to the highest degree of personal liberty and personal
rights that has ever been enjoyed for any considerable time by any
people within the historic period. We had escaped from the bondage
of feudalism, from the tyranny of kings and parliaments, and safeguarded ourselves against the whims and oppressions of majorities. In
face of the fact that with the coming of the industrial order, society has
tended again to rearrange itself in classes, with those having the greatest financial power at the top and those having less financial power at
the bottom, in a general way typifying the old feudalistic order from
which we struggled so hard to release ourselves, there has again sprung
up a demand for a release from constitutional restraints, and a return to
parliamentary supremacy. It is calmly proposed to depart from a government of laws to a government of men.
One of the anomalous things is that although the Revolution of 1776
was as much a revolt against the tyranny of pailiaments as against the
tyranny of a king, it is now proposed to lodge in Congress, which is a
parliament, the supreme power to do the very things which the Constitution was set up to prevent Congress from doing. The Revolutionary War was brought on as much by the Stamp Act, the Search and
Seizures Act, and the Taxation Acts passed by Parliament, as by the
Orders in Council made by the King and his ministers. While the
Declaration of Independence was addressed to the King and Parliament
was not specifically mentioned, Parliament was equally, if not more
responsible than he, for the conditions which drove the colonists to
action. It is now solemnly proposed that we return to the system, our
escape from which we have supposed for one hundred fifty years to be
our greatest blessing.
Whence comes the demand for this change of system? It is not too
much to say that it comes from those who, having a clearer vision of the
nature of the change which society is undergoing, are impatient because this change cannot be effected at once and completely. They are
not willing to wait until the beginnings of a new tradition have been
established. They wish the transformation to be made immediately.
They wish to pull up the plant now and then to see if it is growing.
Conceding that their motives are of the best and that they are actuated
solely by a desire to promote the general welfare, can it be said that
they act wisely? If here and there measures designed to aid in the
process of adjustment to the new order are held to be in violation of
constitutional restraints, that is no reason for throwing overboard the
whole constitutional structure.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Many articles have been written to show that the power of courts
to declare void laws which contravene constitutional limitations is
derived from the Constitution itself. Certain it is that power is the
only thing that distinguishes in substance our constitutional system
from the parliamentary system of Great Britain. Whether we shall
abandon our own system and return to theirs in whole or in part is a
political question, a discussion of which is not germane to the matter
which we are considering. It is not strange that among the most
thoughtful and patriotic of our people there are differences of opinion.
The deep-seated tendency which causes us to carry forward our traditional concepts of social and legal relations is so strong that it is difficult in many cases for us to distinguish between these concepts and
fundamental constitutional principles. It is charged, and not without
reason, that courts have in certain instances declared laws unconstitutional because they contravened the social and legal concepts of the
judges rather than constitutional principles.
For instance, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (43 Supreme Court
Reporter, 394) the minimum wage law for women enacted for the
District of Columbia was held unconstitutional because in the opinion
of the court there was no ascertainable relation between the health and
morals of women and their wages. In criticism of that decision, it has
been said that whether or not there was such a relation was a question
of fact, the determination of which was primarily for the legislative
branch. Chief .Justice Taft dissenting said:
With deference to the very able opinion of the court and my brethren
who concur in it, it appears to me to exaggerate the importance of the
wage term of the contract of employment as more inviolate than its
other terms. Its conclusion seems influenced by the fear that the concession of the power to impose a minimum wage must carry with it a concession of the power to fix a maximum wage.
It is difficult to see how it can be said that statutes regulating hours
of labor, working conditions, times and -method of payment of wages,
all of which limit freedom of contract, are valid and constitutional, and
that a law which fixes a minimum wage is a "naked, arbitrary exercise
of power," that cannot be allowed to stand. under the Constitution of
the United States. If what the Chief Justice says is true, the minimum
wage law under consideration in the Adkins case was held to be unconstitutional because it contravened the traditional concepts of the rights
of individuals held by the judges concurring in the opinion rather than
a constitutional principle.1 In some cases the court could see the rela' See Groat, Economic Wage and Legal Wage, Yale Lqw Journal, March, 1924,
p. 489.
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tion dealt with by the legislature; in the Adkins case it could not. The
fact that an act of Congress or of a legislature may be held invalid by
a court for some reason other than the plain violation of a constitutional
provision, exhibits no doubt the greatest weakness in our system.
But what is the proper remedy? Because imperfection crops out
here and there, shall we destroy the entire system? While it is at
times charged that judges are ultra-conservative, reactionary, behind
the times, and not in sympathy with the ideals of the majority, yet it is
not charged that they are seeking power for their personal aggrandizement as executives sometimes do, or that they are playing politics, and
shaping their decisions for their personal political advantage as legislators have been known to do. Are our hundreds of years of experience
under the parliamentary system such as to warrant the people in conferring upon our legislatures-state and national-unlimited power?
Has any other system over any considerable period of time produced
better results than has ours? Conceded that courts have here and there
erred and have mistaken their own legal concepts for constitutional
principles, yet that constitutes no justification for a change from the
constitutional to the parliamentary system. The Constitution itself provides a method by which mistakes may be corrected. Experience shows
that the Constitution is not difficult of amendment, for the conscience of
a people is not bound by a decision which contravenes its ideas of
justice. Whatever system is adopted or devised, it must in the end
depend upon the wisdom and capacity of the men who administer it,
and therefore perfection should not be expected.
That the transition from the older more individualistic order to the
newer more complex industrial order is well under way is indicated
in numerous ways. A comparison of the laws enacted more recently
in the exercise of the police power and for the regulation of individual
and group activities with those enacted in an equal number of years
in any prior period, makes the truth of this at once manifest. The
order of development is of interest. First came a marked increase in
the development on the material side, the production of consumable
goods. At first increased social pressure was not noticeable, due no
doubt to our constantly expanding frontier, which for a time equalized
it. With the closing of the frontier, however, which is said officially
to have closed in the last decade of the nineteenth century, greater and
greater adjustments have been necessary and by statute and decision
there has been a conscious effort to facilitate and direct the process
of adjustment; hence the rapidly increasing mass of statutes in the last
thirty years, which marks the second phase of the transition.
Last of all has come a willingness on the part of the great masses of
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our people to adjust their thinking and conduct to the new situation.
Here the tendency to carry forward the standards and traditions of the
past is most strongly exhibited. Industry is manned by individuals
who are yet thinking in terms of the old individualistic order. Whatever they are willing to do or say or have done or said as to the duty
of others, they refuse to conform in their own affairs to the demands
of the newer order. Our material growth and legal development have
in many respects outrun the ability of the people to adapt their thought
and action to the changing order. The development of statutory law
cannot too far precede the acceptance of the new order by the people.
If it does, there is consequent loss and reaction and the ground must
be traversed again with greater difficulty than in the first instance.
WATitness the progress of laws to regulate the hours and wages of labor.
In order to demonstrate that the process of adjustment is proceeding
by the application of fundamental constitutional principles to the relations growing out of the new order, it is only necessary to refer to the
great mass of decisions of recent .years holding valid legislative enactments regulating hours of labor, "wages, conditions of employment,
sanitation, housing; laws prohibiting the adulteration of foods and
drugs; zoning laws, trading stamp laws, decisions impressing property
engaged in public service with a public use, and many others. Many
people feel that in thus adapting our legal system to the demands of the
newer order, we have departed from the fundamental principles of the
Constitution. That is not true. The law deals with legal relations. We
have altered our legal concepts so as to make applicable fundamental
principles to relationships which did not exist before. For instance, the
law of master and servant under the old order embodied the principles
which now govern and will continue to govern the same relationship in
the new order, but under the new order there was no tradition which
threw upon the economic unit in which the individual was employed
responsibility for injury and death. Therefore, the law has attached
to that relationship responsibility on the part of the master in that
respect. This works no change in principle but adapts the general
principle which had operated under a similar social order to the conditions as they exist at the present time, and compels industry to bear
the burdens properly and necessarily incident thereto as a part of the
cost of operation. This in the main it had done in one way or another
through all previous time.
The development has proceeded to some extent in a fragmentary and
illogical way, but nevertheless it proceeds in accordance with certain
underlying fundamental principles. Referring again to the relationship of master and servant, there has been an attempt to carry over into
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the new order in the form of written law those duties and obligations
which the master and ihe servant recognized and were accustomed to
discharge as a matter of tradition under the old order. For instance,
the safe place statutes are designed to insure for every workman in
industry the same protection the head of the family would have felt it
necessary to provide for his children and employes under the old order.
It is because the change from the home to the factory broke the tradition that regulation of the situation by law became necessary. A new
relationship was set up which had no such tradition. The beginnings of
a new tradition are apparent. Profit sharing schemes, representation
of labor in management, industrial insurance, plant organization of
various kinds, are indications of an attempt to solve the problems of adjustment by mutual effort rather than by more rigid.coercive statutory
measures. The underlying principles along which development should
2
proceed are indicated by Dr. Carver in his Essays in Social Justice
as follows:
It may as well be admitted that the old liberalism erred in assuming
a general harmony of interests and in concluding that government control and regulation should be limited to mere protection from violence.
The new liberalism must correct this error by recognizing the conflict
of interests and extending the control of government to all cases where
individual interests conflict. The new gospel of individualism must
therefore proclaim three things: x. The absolute necessity for the suppression of all harmful methods of pursuing one's self-interest. 2. The
absolute freedom of the individual fo pursue his self-interest in all
serviceable ways. 3. The absolute responsibility of the individual for
his own wellbeing, allowing those to prosper who, on their own initiative, find, ways of serving the community, and allowing those who cannot to endure the shame of poverty.
If the process of adjustment proceeds alofig these lines, there is no
reason why the purpose of the Constitution to promote the general welfare and to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity
should not be achieved in an orderly way under constitutional restraints.
In this transitionary period, we are more and more thrown back upon
fundamental principles. The difficulty is that many persons seek to
apply these principles to the new order in exactly the way they were
applied to the old order. If the change from the one order to the other
had come more slowly, the adjustment would have been much easier.
In no field is the maxim "make haste slowly" more applicable than in
the development of the law. However, we must meet conditions as they
are and not as we would like to have them.
We must adapt our thinking and our conduct to social facts as they
'Page 159.
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exist. We may some day free ourselves from the influence of some
of the fallacious political concepts of the eighteenth century. While
in a very real sense government rests upon the consent of the governed,
the activities of man are limited or governed in innumerable ways to
which he is never asked to consent. The compact theory of society
should never have had a place in our juristic thinking. It may have
served a useful purpose, but many unwarrantable inferences are derived
from it which have no application to modern life, if indeed they were
ever applicable at any tithe. We are members of one body and we
must, in the face of that fact, take up and discharge our appropriate
functions. We are not unattached individuals, wandering in social
space, giving our consent here and withholding it there. What we need
in the field of jurisprudence is more thinking with reference to the
facts as they exist and less exposition of eighteenth century philosophical concepts. We need a clearer apprehension of what is necessary
to do justice under the present order and less vindication of the concept of natural rights under the old order.
We must restate our ideals in terms of our present day experience.
Above all we must not substitute restraint and oppression for liberty,
exploitation of class by class for justice, or, in the name of equality,
iestore class privilege under the law.

